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Abstract 
There is no question that the current liberal world order faces yet another challenge. The 
upcoming challenge that we are about to confront is an exceptionally different kind of 
challenge. This challenge is the emergence of what I call a disruptive politics in the heartland 
of consolidated liberal states. The two main side effects of disruptive politics can be seen at 
both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, there is growing rise of populism 
in stable western democracies epitomized with the election of Donald Trump as President of 
the United States of America. Internationally, there is a growing rejection of globalization 
and integration, exemplified by the UK leaving the EU. Many commentators and pundits 
have observed that the rise of disruptive politics is the very threat to the liberal world order 
that could eventually cause it to collapse from within. While the side effects of disruptive 
politics should be addressed with caution; however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive 
politics with its side effects such as the rise of populism and the growing contend with the 
globalization. I would argue that disruptive politics is necessary for the survival of the liberal 
world order. Disruptive politics is a way to make us realize that liberal democracy is not 
perfect, and we need to fix it. This essay explores the notion of disruptive politics and the 
challenge it poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It then offers three insights on how to 
maintain the liberal world order in an age of disruptive politics. 
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The Challenges from within 
There is no question that the 
current liberal world order faces yet 
another challenge. Indeed, since its 
inception by the western power from the 
ashes of World War II, the liberal world 
order has always been challenged, by the 
spread of communism during the Cold 
War, and the rise of terrorism after 9/11, 
which is becoming even more diffused and 
decentralized. Despite the challenges, the 
liberal world order has survived and 
flourished. It provides a relatively more 
stable world than before it existed. Even 
the non-western rising power that 
seemingly challenges the liberal world 
order has, for the most part, accepted this 
order and hugely benefitted from it.  
Nevertheless, the upcoming 
challenge that we are about to confront is 
an exceptionally different kind of 
challenge. Many have thought that the 
main challenges of the liberal world order 
come from the without especially pressure 
from the others. Surprisingly the challenge 
in fact comes from the within. This 
challenge is the emergence of what I call a 
disruptive politics in the heartland of 
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consolidated liberal states. The two main 
side effects of disruptive politics can be 
seen at both the domestic and international 
levels. Domestically, there is growing rise 
of populism in stable western democracies 
epitomized with the election of Donald 
Trump as President of the United States of 
America. Internationally, there is a 
growing rejection of globalization and 
integration, exemplified by the UK leaving 
the EU. 
Many commentators and pundits 
have observed that the rise of disruptive 
politics is the very threat to the liberal 
world order that could eventually cause it 
to collapse from within. International 
experts like Stephen Walt (2016), Ian 
Buruma (2017), and the New York Times’ 
Roger Cohen (2017) have warned about the 
dark times facing the liberal world order 
with the recent disruptive politics 
happening in the western liberal 
democracies. Joe Biden even stated that the 
liberal world order is at risk of collapsing 
in his last international remarks as US Vice 
President at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos (Biden, 2017).  
While the side effects of disruptive 
politics should be addressed with caution; 
however, it is misleading to equate the 
disruptive politics with its side effects. I 
would argue that disruptive politics is 
necessary for the survival of the liberal 
world order. Disruptive politics is a way to 
make us realize that liberal order is not 
perfect, and we need to fix it. 
This policy note explores the notion 
of disruptive politics and the challenge it 
poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It 
then considers the way in which global 
leaders should manage the liberal world 
order in the age of disruptive politics. This 
note concludes that there is a need for 
world leaders to rethink the way in which 
the liberal world order should be 
maintained. 
Understanding Disruptive Politics 
within the Liberal Order 
In 1995, Clayton Christensen (1997) 
put forward the notion of disruptive 
innovation as “an innovation that creates a 
new market and value network and 
eventually disrupts an existing market and 
value network.” Borrowing the notion of 
disruptive innovation, I define disruptive 
politics as a politics that interrupts the 
established order of things, particularly in 
the core constituency of the liberal order.  
Disruptive politics is particularly 
different from conventional contentious 
politics, defined as “a politics that uses 
disruptive methods to make a political 
point or to change particular government 
policies” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). While 
contentious politics can be seen 
throughout both democracies and 
autocracies, disruptive politics is a slow 
process within liberal democracy that 
strikes at the very core of the liberal world 
order, namely liberal democracy and 
global capitalism. Just like the call for 
democracy in an authoritarian regime, 
disruptive politics within democracies is 
mainly caused by the politics of 
resentment, particularly towards the status 
quo and the elites who undermine the 
ordinary people. 
In the authoritarian setting, 
disruption often occurred due to the lack of 
freedom to contend the authoritarian rule 
and demand on regime change. In liberal 
democracies with a stable democratic 
transfer of power, the very same 
disruption rarely happened. Liberal 
democracy has embraced protests and 
dissidents as part of its legitimation 
strategy and provided democratic 
platforms that neutralize resistance 
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towards the status quo. But it does not 
address the issue of inequality where the 
accumulation of power in the hands of the 
few has made the voice of most of the 
people unheard. An interesting study 
conducted by political scientist Martin 
Gilens and Benjamin Page on the US 
democracy reveals that ordinary citizens 
have a non-significant influence on public 
policies compared to the economic elites 
(Gilens & Page, 2014). With this condition, 
democracy has been habituated as a 
ceremonial celebration for the ordinary 
citizens while the decisions are dominated 
by rich and powerful elites.  
In the long run, just like in 
authoritarian rule, liberal democracies, 
instead of being the government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people, 
as envisioned by Abraham Lincoln, have 
metamorphosed to become an oligarchy. 
The recent predicament in the liberal 
democracies is perfectly summed up in 
Animal Farm’s famous remarks, “all 
animals are equal, but some animals are 
more equal than others” (Orwell, 2003). To 
tame these circumstances, disruptive 
politics is needed.  
Borrowing from Carol Hanisch 
(1969), the occurrence of disruptive politics 
has made politics become more personal 
and personal is political. While the status 
quo within democracies has disconnected 
the politics from the people, disruptive 
politics could empower people to be more 
involved in politics for better or worse. 
Some commentators have even argued that 
the recent rise of populist nationalism in 
mainstream western political discourse 
might have been made possible by a 
collective loss of faith in democracy.  
It is possible to read what I have 
written here as a defense of the rise of 
populism and the decline of liberal 
principles. But my message is the exact 
opposite. Disruptive politics can have 
dangerous outcomes, but this is by no 
means the end of the liberal world order. It 
is Janus-faced. On the one hand, it might 
lead to the decline of liberal democracy 
with the rise of populist nationalism where 
angry democratic majorities rule, which 
might lead to the rise of authoritarian 
strong men. On the other hand, it could 
provide us with an opportunity to reform 
the core principles of liberal world order, 
which the national and global agenda have 
been aggressively pursuing, particularly 
since the end of the Cold War. Disruptive 
politics is a harsh wake up call to both the 
elites and the average citizens that the 
liberal world order is not without its 
shortcomings. Through disruptive politics, 
we have been given a chance to step back 
and reassess the national and global 
agenda of the liberal world order. 
Managing Disruptive Politics: A 
Southeast Asian Perspective 
With the emergence of disruptive 
politics, what kind of global political order 
will emerge in the aftermath? This is 
indeed a very important question that has 
attracted the attention of the brightest 
minds. To contribute to the debate, I offer 
three insights on how to maintain the 
liberal world order in an age of disruptive 
politics. 
First, the disruptive politics 
happening in the western world could 
provide fresh voices from the non-western 
powers to come up in defense of the liberal 
world order. Rather than antagonizing 
over the non-western powers’ motives in 
pursuing global leadership, it is time for 
western leaders to trust the non-western 
world in terms of the burden of leadership 
sharing to maintain the global order. The 
disruptive politics unfortunately has 
brought the discourse of protectionism and 
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anti-globalization into mainstream 
western politics, with President Trump’s 
statement “Buy American Hire American” 
(Chu, 2017). Surprisingly it was the 
Chinese president, Xi Jinping who 
denounced protectionism and defended 
globalization (Fidler, Chen, & Wei, 2017). 
The so-called rising power that is 
considered illiberal is the one that 
seemingly holds the principle of the liberal 
order dearly. This suggests that even 
though non-western powers may not yet 
fully embrace the liberal principles, they 
are aware of the importance of maintaining 
the liberal world order. 
In the case of Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia has tried to play a constructive 
role in supporting global world order 
particularly through the promotion of its 
democratic values albeit in its own way 
and with its own caveats (Karim, 2017b). 
Indonesia has been a promoter of 
democratic ideals and human rights values 
at the regional level. This shows that non-
western power could become the 
supporter of western-dominated world 
order in promoting western liberal norm. 
other than being supporter of western-
dominated liberal order, countries within 
Southeast Asia also concern on the 
importance of the western military 
presence as a force of balancing in the 
region (Karim & Chairil, 2016).  
Indeed that disruptive politics 
create uncertainty for Southeast Asia given 
that regional architecture built by ASEAN 
has been based on US-sponsored liberal 
international order through which ASEAN 
aimed to diffuse the norms into its regional 
norm and mechanisms (Chong, 2017). 
Moreover, under Obama’s leadership, 
ASEAN has been leveraged into one of the 
most important agenda within the US 
foreign policy with its pivot to Asia 
strategy thus boost ASEAN strategic 
important in the region. The disruptive 
politics with the election of Trump that 
focus on his “American first” slogan, has 
indeed shaken this progress and thus 
might change the balance in favor of China.  
However, the disruptive politics 
certainly create a new space for second-tier 
countries in the Asia-Pacific to show their 
willingness to cooperate and initiate their 
own commitment without the need to have 
the great power on board. Although 
Donald Trump has succeeded in getting 
the United States out of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), it does not necessarily 
make Asia-pacific countries unable to 
spawn similar things without the United 
States. At the APEC summit in Danang, 
Vietnam, Trade ministers from 11 Asia-
Pacific countries agreed on to press ahead 
with a major trade deal without the United 
States, as they seek to go it alone without 
the involvement of Donald Trump’s 
America. 
Secondly, the disruptive politics 
has demonstrated how economic 
resentment towards global capitalism 
emanating from perceived inequality 
could tear apart the social fabric of the 
liberal order. Global capitalism has indeed 
lifted hundreds of millions of people out of 
poverty around the world, especially in 
Asia. Yet, it also brings huge inequality and 
social injustice too. In the eastern world, 
China’s embrace of economic globalization 
has not only made it an economic 
powerhouse but has also led to it becoming 
a country with one of the highest levels of 
income inequality in the world, where one 
percent of the richest households own a 
third of the country’s wealth. The 
conundrum that most of the time is 
happening on the periphery has now 
reached its core. In the US, inequality has 
become even greater, reaching its most 
extreme point since the Great Depression 
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(Desilver, 2013). In Europe, inequality has 
risen substantially since the mid-1980s 
(Fredriksen, 2012). Basically, inequality has 
become the Achilles heel of the liberal 
order. I believe that the explanation for the 
rise of racism and xenophobia as well as 
the allure for the strong men in western 
democracies cannot be separated from the 
growing inequality within society. 
Inequality will incite fear and insecurity 
among people. In return they can be easily 
mobilized for hatred towards others 
(Karim, 2017a). It is time for the global 
leaders to genuinely focus on solving the 
tension between the inequality produced 
by market capitalism and the equality that 
is required by democracy. 
Southeast Asia is also home for the 
rise of inequality particularly due to the 
impact the lack of the government to 
address market failure and reduce rent-
seeking activities. While in general, the 
case of inequality has been experienced by 
Southeast Asian countries, however, Lao 
PDR and Indonesia have inequality trends 
that should be a cause of concerns (Yap, 
2013). In a long run, the economic growth 
without inequality would only create 
dissatisfaction that may lead to social 
unrest. The inequality could also endanger 
the regional integration project in 
Southeast Asia once the project deemed to 
be detrimental toward the poor and 
vulnerable section of the society given the 
benefits of economic integration have often 
been unequally distributed.  
It is the time for Southeast Asian 
countries to find out what is the best way 
to increase its wealth while at the same 
time reduce the gap of inequality. To do 
this, at least, there should be a shift in how 
the economic elites should see the 
development paradigm of neoliberal 
economic agenda which shows its failure 
in creating wealth with equality. Thus, 
ASEAN countries should pay attention to 
concept of inclusive growth seriously. The 
inclusive growth could start with the 
economic policy that focus on investing in 
public goods such as infrastructure, 
healthcare and the environment.  
Thirdly, we need to reconsider the 
way in which the core values of the liberal 
order should be promoted. Democracy will 
be the most desirable form of government 
and the global standard for legitimate 
governance, despite the seemingly 
democratic decline and the variety of 
models that might not be particularly 
liberal (Ikenberry, 2011). And so is 
capitalism. Though not always subscribing 
to the notion of a liberal free-market, most 
of countries will eventually embrace 
capitalism as the way in which to govern 
their economy in the foreseeable future. 
However, the assumption that liberal 
principles should be universally accepted 
is not only wrong but also dangerous. 
We should learn on how the two 
decades of liberal interventionist policy 
have failed and created more instability in 
some parts of the world. It has even 
nurtured antipathy from the periphery 
states of the liberal order. The challenge 
posed by disruptive politics also cautiously 
shows us that even mature liberal 
democracy is not immune from shifting 
towards an illiberal one. We should learn 
from history that there is always a danger 
of imperial overstretch even when it comes 
to ideas. Liberal principles might be the last 
man standing in history. Yet just like many 
other ideas, it is far from perfect. It is time 
to be humble and let the two core liberal 
principles evolve into a variety of models 
that stem from different cultural and 
historical contexts. 
Indeed, that there is a steady 
decrease of democratic space as well as the 
protections of human rights in Southeast 
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Asia. Many countries remain 
undemocratic, and others have taken a 
worryingly repressive turn (Edwards & 
Karim, 2016). This might be caused by the 
negative views on democratic norm due to 
the liberal interventionist policies that are 
failing in any other parts of the world. 
Rather than seeing it as a failure of 
democracy alone, disruptive politics 
should remind us the need to create our 
own system and norm that also reflect the 
universality of democratic and human 
rights norm while at the same time accept 
the cultural and historical differences. In 
this case, Southeast Asian countries should 
able to increase the role of ASEAN human 
rights mechanisms as well as enabling its 
own civil society to foster its local norm on 
democracy and human rights. 
A Move Forward 
It seems quite self-evident to say 
that change always creates uncertainty, 
and the way we perceive changes often 
determines how we respond to them. But 
this is straightforward advice for us in an 
age of disruptive politics. Disruptive 
politics has certainly changed the course of 
the liberal world order into unchartered 
territory. We can see it as a threat and 
hence react accordingly. Or we can see it as 
an opportunity and thus mitigate its 
negative side effects. The disruptive 
politics happening in the western world 
should remind us that no matter how 
globalized and integrated our world is, our 
thousand-year old tribalistic DNA is still 
there. As long as a large segment of the 
population do not feel the benefits and feel 
alienated from the process, liberal 
principles only strengthen the boundaries 
and thicken the barrier. 
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